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OPINION OF THE COURT           
___________ 
 
VANASKIE, Circuit Judge. 
 
Michael Marcavage brought an action under 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983 against the National Park Service, the United States 
Department of the Interior, and Park Service Rangers Alan 
Saperstein and Ian Crane, alleging violations of his rights 
under the First Amendment, the Fourth Amendment, and the 
Equal Protection Clause.  The District Court granted the 




On October 6, 2007, Marcavage, using a bullhorn, led 
an anti-abortion demonstration on the sidewalk of Sixth Street 
at the entrance to the Liberty Bell Center at Independence 
National Historical Park in Philadelphia.  Marcavage and his 
group shared the sidewalk with tourists, horse and carriage 
operators, and participants in a walk for the Susan G. Komen 
Foundation, an organization dedicated to eliminating breast 
cancer. 
 
At approximately 11:45 a.m., Ranger Saperstein 
informed Marcavage that he would have to vacate the 
sidewalk because it was not designated as a First Amendment 
area under Park regulations.  Saperstein also expressed 
concern that Marcavage’s group was potentially interfering 
with traffic flow on the sidewalk and upsetting visitors to the 
Park.  Saperstein issued Marcavage an oral permit to continue 
his rally on the opposite side of the Liberty Bell Center, 
which was open for First Amendment activity under Park 
regulations.  Chief Ranger Crane, Saperstein’s supervisor, 
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also spoke with Marcavage via telephone and similarly 
encouraged Marcavage to move to another area of the Park. 
Marcavage refused this and other requests to leave the 
sidewalk.  
 
Over two hours later, at approximately 2:05 p.m., 
Saperstein, while holding Marcavage’s hands behind his 
back, escorted him off the Sixth Street sidewalk.  Saperstein 
then issued Marcavage a citation for “[v]iolating a term or 
condition of a permit” under 36 C.F.R. § 1.6(g)(2).  Later, 
another citation for “[i]nterfering with agency functions” 
under 36 C.F.R. § 2.32 was mailed to Marcavage.  A United 
States Magistrate Judge subsequently convicted Marcavage of 
both misdemeanors.  United States v. Marcavage, No. 08-
0511, 2009 WL 2170099 (E.D. Pa. June 17, 2009) 
(“Marcavage I”).  The convictions were affirmed by a United 
States District Judge. United States v. Marcavage, No. 08-mj-
0511, 2009 WL 2170094 (E.D. Pa. July 16, 2009) 
(“Marcavage II”).  On further appeal, however, we reversed.  
United States v. Marcavage, 609 F.3d 264 (3d Cir. 2010) 
(“Marcavage III”).  We held that there was insufficient 
evidence to support Marcavage’s conviction for “violating a 
term or condition of a permit,” and vacated his conviction for 
“interfering with agency functions” on the ground that it was 
invalid under the First Amendment.  
 
While Marcavage’s appeal from his convictions was 
still pending, he filed this action.  The District Court stayed 
proceedings pending the outcome of the criminal appeal.  
Once we decided the appeal, Marcavage filed an amended 
complaint.  Marcavage alleged that his arrest violated the 
First Amendment, the Fourth Amendment, and the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as applied to 
federal officials through the Fifth Amendment.  He sought 
compensatory and punitive damages along with declaratory 
and injunctive relief. 
 
Defendants moved to dismiss Marcavage’s action 
under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 
and the District Court granted the motion.  Marcavage v. 
Nat’l Park Serv., 777 F. Supp. 2d 858 (E.D. Pa. 2011).  The 
District Court dismissed the damages claims against the 
National Park Service and the Department of the Interior on 
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the ground that an action pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown 
Named Agents of  Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 
(1971) cannot be pursued against the federal government and 
its agencies absent a waiver, and no waiver occurred here.  
See Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 475 
(1994).  The District Court then found that Saperstein and 
Crane were entitled to qualified immunity from both the First 
Amendment and the Fourth Amendment claims because 
Marcavage’s First Amendment rights were not clearly 
established at the time of his arrest, and Marcavage could not 
show that the rangers acted without probable cause when 
arresting him.  The District Court also dismissed Marcavage’s 
Equal Protection claim because he was not similarly situated 
to the other groups in front of the entrance to the Liberty Bell 
Center who were allowed to stay on the Sixth Street sidewalk.  
Finally, the District Court dismissed as moot Marcavage’s 
claims for injunctive and declaratory relief, as the National 
Park Service has revised its regulations to designate the Sixth 
Street sidewalk as a public area open for First Amendment 
activity, and issued new regulations exempting groups of 
under twenty-five individuals from permit requirements.  See 
Independence National Historic Park, Superintendent’s 




 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 
1331 and 1343, and we have appellate jurisdiction under 28 
U.S.C. § 1291.  Our review of an order granting a motion to 
dismiss is plenary.  Anspach ex rel. Anspach v. City of Phila., 
Dep’t of Pub. Health, 503 F.3d 256, 260 (3d Cir. 2007).  
When reviewing a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, we accept as true 
all well-pled factual allegations in the complaint, and view 




 The doctrine of qualified immunity involves a two-part 
test.  See Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 377 (2007).  The 
defendants are entitled to qualified immunity unless the 
plaintiff demonstrates that both prongs have been satisfied.  
Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2080 (2011) (quoting 
Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 475 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)).  First, there 
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must be “a violation of a constitutional right.”  Scott, 550 U.S. 
at 377.  Second, that right must be “clearly established . . . in 
light of the specific context of the case.”  Id. (quoting Saucier 
v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001)).  Marcavage argues that 
his “rights to engage in fundamental speech activities on a 
public sidewalk were clearly established.” (Appellant’s Br. 
18.)  We disagree with this contention.   
 
As the Supreme Court has noted, “[i]f judges . . . 
disagree on a constitutional question, it is unfair to subject 
police to money damages for picking the losing side of the 
controversy.”  Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 618 (1999).  
Both a United States Magistrate Judge and a United States 
District Judge previously determined that the Sixth Street 
sidewalk was a nonpublic forum – an area that is not used by 
tradition or designation for public expression and that 
consequently carries a less stringent standard of review when 
assessing government justifications for limiting speech.  See 
Marcavage I, 2009 WL 2170099, at *3; Marcavage II, 2009 
WL 2170094, at *8.  This led both judges to find 
Marcavage’s arrest constitutionally permissible.  While we 
ultimately held otherwise, the fact that two judges found no 
First Amendment violation indicates that Marcavage’s 
constitutional right to demonstrate on the Sixth Street 
sidewalk was not clearly established.   
 
As we noted in Marcavage III, “[t]he question whether 
a particular sidewalk is a public or a nonpublic forum is 
highly fact-specific and no one factor is dispositive.” 609 
F.3d at 275.  It was reasonable for the rangers to believe that 
their conduct comported with the First Amendment when 
they escorted Marcavage off the Sixth Street sidewalk and 
issued him a citation.  They should not be stripped of 
qualified immunity simply because this belief turned out to be 
mistaken.   
 
Marcavage argues that “first amendment freedoms will 
be seriously jeopardized” should “mistaken judicial 
conclusions . . . be[] fashioned into tools to shield officers 
from liability for content-based discrimination.”  (Appellant’s 
Reply Br. 3.)  We disagree.  Marcavage’s First Amendment 
rights were already vindicated when we vacated his previous 
conviction.  It is one thing to decide that a conviction violates 
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the First Amendment.  It is quite another to subject the 
arresting officers to damages for making a reasonable 
mistake.  Accordingly, Saperstein and Crane are entitled to 





 Marcavage next argues that the defendants are not 
entitled to qualified immunity on his Fourth Amendment 
claim because “no probable cause existed to arrest” him.  
(Appellant’s Br. 29.)  Although we ultimately vacated 
Marcavage’s conviction for “interfering with agency 
functions” on First Amendment grounds, we noted in 
Marcavage III “that the government presented sufficient 
evidence for the Magistrate Judge to have reasonably found 
that Marcavage . . . committed ‘interference.’”  609 F.3d at 
272.  A criminal conviction requires proof of guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt, a much higher standard than that required 
for a finding of probable cause.  See Orsatti v. N.J. State 
Police, 71 F.3d 480, 482-83 (3d Cir. 1995).  If there was 
sufficient evidence to support Marcavage’s conviction, by 
definition there must also have been probable cause to arrest 
him.   
 
The fact that Marcavage’s conviction was later 
reversed is not determinative.  As noted above, to strip 
Saperstein and Crane of qualified immunity requires the 
violation of a clearly established constitutional right.  
Marcavage’s right to demonstrate on the Sixth Street 
sidewalk was far from clear at the time of his arrest.  As we 
observed in Gilles v. Davis, “it does not necessarily follow 
that the arresting officers are civilly liable for [] arrest[s]” 
carried out under regulations that are ultimately held to be 
unconstitutional.  427 F.3d 197, 207 (3d Cir. 2005).  As the 
Supreme Court stated in Hunter v. Bryant, “[t]he qualified 
immunity standard ‘gives ample room for mistaken 
judgments’ by protecting ‘all but the plainly incompetent or 
those who knowingly violate the law.’”  502 U.S. 224, 229 
(1991) (quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 343 (1986)).  
Until we reversed the Magistrate Judge and District Judge in 
Marcavage III, Saperstein and Crane had made no mistake.  
They had better than probable cause – they had evidence 
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sufficient for a conviction.  As in the First Amendment 
context, qualified immunity bars Marcavage’s Fourth 




  Marcavage also claims that the District Court erred in 
its equal protection analysis and failed to “evaluat[e] 
Marcavage’s claim under a ‘class of one’ theory.”  
(Appellant’s Br. 33.)  In order to successfully bring about an 
equal protection claim based on the “class of one” doctrine, 
the plaintiff must allege “that she has been intentionally 
treated differently from others similarly situated and that 
there is no rational basis for the difference in treatment.”  Vill. 
of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000).   
 
 Marcavage was not similarly situated to the tourists, 
the horse and carriage operators, and the walk participants 
who were also on the Sixth Street sidewalk.  Unlike all three 
groups, Marcavage used a bullhorn and remained standing on 
the sidewalk for over two hours.  Marcavage was also present 
at the Park without a permit, unlike the horse and carriage 
operators, who were required to obtain one in order to 
conduct business in the Park.  See 36 C.F.R. § 5.3.  
Marcavage contends these differences are immaterial.  We 
disagree.  We held in Startzell v. City of Philadelphia, for 
example, that volunteers in a government-permitted event 
“were not similarly situated to . . . attendees with no 
relationship to the organizers whatsoever.”  533 F.3d 183, 
203 (3d Cir. 2008).  Similarly, we held in Marcavage III that 
“ensuring traffic flow and/or public safety, and regulating 
noise” are “undoubtedly . . . legitimate government 
interest[s].” 609 F.3d at 287.   
 
 Marcavage observes that “[s]ome of the individuals 
gathered [on the Sixth Street sidewalk] were of a different 
race than Marcavage.  Some were wearing differently colored 
or styled clothing.  Some likely belonged to a different 
religious group or had no religious affiliation.  Those facts do 
not make Marcavage dissimilar.”  (Appellant’s Reply Br. 8-
9.)  We agree, and this would be a different case if Marcavage 
were escorted from the Sixth Street sidewalk because of any 
of those differences.  But he was not.  Marcavage was 
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escorted from the sidewalk because he was leading a 
demonstration without a permit, creating excessive noise, and 
potentially interfering with traffic flow.  He was not “in all 
relevant respects alike” the others who shared the Sixth Street 
sidewalk.  Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 10 (1992).  





 Finally, Marcavage argues that the District Court erred 
in dismissing for mootness his claims for declaratory and 
injunctive relief.  He contends that the new regulations issued 
by the National Park Service that would specifically allow for 
permit-less demonstrations of under twenty-five individuals 
on the Sixth Street sidewalk are a “voluntary cessation of a 
challenged policy” that “does not deprive a federal court of its 
power to determine the legality of the practice.”  (Appellant’s 
Br. 40.)   
 
 The standard used to analyze mootness based on 
voluntary conduct was set forth by the Supreme Court in 
Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services, 
Inc., which provides that “[a] case might become moot if 
subsequent events made it absolutely clear that the allegedly 
wrongful behavior could not reasonably be expected to 
recur.”  528 U.S. 167, 189 (2000) (quoting United States v. 
Concentrated Phosphate Exp. Ass’n., 393 U.S. 199, 203 
(1968)). 
 
 Marcavage looks to Parents Involved in Community 
Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 (2007), 
to support his argument.  He also contends that the facts of 
“[t]his case bears close resemblance to” United States v. 
Government of the Virgin Islands, 363 F.3d 276 (3d Cir. 
2004) (Appellant’s Br. 41.)  We disagree.  In Parents 
Involved, the Supreme Court held that a Seattle school district 
had not met the standard for mootness set forth in Friends of 
the Earth because the district had only stopped applying the 
challenged policy “pending the outcome of this litigation,” 
and “nowhere suggests that if this litigation is resolved in its 
favor it will not resume” the challenged policy.  551 U.S. at 
719.  Here, by way of contrast, the Park Service is not 
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contesting the determination in Marcavage III  that the Sixth 
Street sidewalk is a public forum.   
 
In Government of the Virgin Islands, we found the 
case not moot because “[t]he timing of the contract 
termination – just five days after the United States moved to 
invalidate it, and just two days before the District Court’s 
hearing on the motion – strongly suggests that the impending 
litigation was the cause of the termination,” and, given the 
continued defense of the contract in question, there was no 
assurance that the Government of the Virgin Islands would 
not enter into a contract similar to the challenged contract in 
the future.  363 F.3d at 285.  In the case before us, in contrast, 
the Park Service did not revise its position on demonstrations 
on the Sixth Street sidewalk in reaction to this civil rights 
action.  It did so only after a definitive determination in 
Marcavage III that the area was indeed a public forum.  
Moreover, there is no indication that the regulation allowing 
permit-less demonstrations involving twenty-five persons or 
fewer was adopted to avoid an adverse judgment in this case 
and will be abandoned once this case becomes final. 
 
As we noted in Bridge v. United States Parole 
Commission, “[g]overnment officials are presumed to act in 
good faith.”  981 F.2d 97, 106 (3d Cir. 1992).  Marcavage has 
been unable to rebut this presumption as he has not made any 
showing of bad faith on the part of the Park Service.  This 
presumption and the changes to the Park Service’s regulations 
concerning protests on the Sixth Street sidewalk make it 
unreasonable to expect that future constitutional violations 
will recur.  The Supreme Court noted in Summers v. Earth 
Island Institute that a plaintiff seeking an injunction “must 
show that he is under threat of suffering ‘injury in fact’ that is 
concrete and particularized; the threat must be actual and 
imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.”  555 U.S. 488, 
493 (2009).  Marcavage is unable to make such a showing, 
and his claims for declaratory and injunctive relief were 
therefore properly dismissed as moot.1
                                              
 1 Even if constitutional mootness does not pertain here, 
dismissal of the requests for injunctive and declaratory relief 
on ground of prudential mootness was warranted.  “The 







 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District 
Court’s judgment.2
                                                                                                     
relief for prudential reasons, even in a case not 
constitutionally moot, is well established.”  Blanciak v. 
Allegheny Ludlum Corp., 77 F.3d 690, 700 (3d Cir. 1996) 
(quoting S-1 v. Spangler, 832 F.2d 294, 297 (4th Cir. 1987)).  
The key inquiry in a prudential mootness analysis is 
“‘whether changes in circumstances that prevailed at the 
beginning of the litigation have forestalled any occasion for 
meaningful relief.’” Int'l Bhd. of Boilermakers v. Kelly, 815 
F.2d 912, 915 (3d Cir. 1987) (quoting Jersey Cent. Power & 
Light Co. v. New Jersey, 772 F.2d 35, 39 (3d Cir. 1985)).  In 
this case, the actions taken by the Park Service in recognizing 
the Sixth Street sidewalk as a public forum and eliminating 
the need for a permit for groups of less than twenty-five 
persons forecloses meaningful injunctive or declaratory relief 
with respect to the October, 2007 incident.  
 
 
 2 Appellees have moved to strike from the Appendix 
filed by Marcavage exhibits and transcript from Marcavage’s 
criminal trial (App. 230a-616a), two DVDs, apparently 
introduced by Marcavage at his criminal trial, (App. 617a-
618a), and the docket sheet from his criminal proceedings.  
(App. 610a-624a.)  It is undisputed that these materials were 
not presented to the District Court as part of the instant case.  
Because the materials could have been, but were not, 
presented to the District Court, and there are no exceptional 
circumstances warranting our consideration of them on this 
appeal, Appellees’ motion will be granted.  See Acumed LLC 
v. Advanced Surgical Servs., 561 F.3d 199, 226-227 (3d Cir. 
2009). 
